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Introduction 
 
Mainly since the mid-1990s, the international community set its eyes on the Colombian conflict. 
The growing interest relates to a series of factors, including changes in the international political 
agenda, a renewed interest of the US in Latin America, the growing interlocking of Colombia´s 
socio-political conflict with issues like human rights, drugs trade, indigenous populations and 
ecology, regional spill-over of the conflict, increase of emigration of Colombian citizens, and 
mediatised cases of victims among the foreign community. 
 
An initiative that brought Europe closer to the situation in Colombia, was the proposal formulated 
by president Virgilio Barco in 1990 for a special plan for economic cooperation in order to tackle 
the drugs problem and linked criminal activities. During César Gaviria’s administration (1990-94), 
and following a visit of European Commission (EC) representatives to Colombia in 1993, the 
parties started to define the terms of economic and technical cooperation, support of NGO projects 
and humanitarian aid. European protests were raised after the murder of leaders of the Unión 
Patriótica and for the violation of human rights, while from the Colombian side accusations were 
launched against military training delivered by British and Israeli nationals to paramilitary groups. 
However, European cooperation in relation to the conflict remained marginal in that period.  
 
The presence of Europe started to take shape during Ernesto Samper’s administration (1994-98) 
when the political situation became more complicated. Sudden requests for international presence 
were launched which attracted the attention of the international community. It was during the 
following administration of President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) that international intervention 
really took-off. Measured on the basis of the numbers of high-level visits and official declarations 
since the mid-1990s, a steadily growing official presence of the EU in Bogotá was observed 
(Ramírez, 2004a: tables 1,2,4).6  In this chapter we will focus on the period since 1998. 
 
This paper attempts to answer two questions. The first is related to how European policy towards 
the Colombian conflict is shaped and, more in particular, how well it is internally coordinated. The 
second question deals with the degree of inter-regionalism in EU policies towards the conflict. 
Before addressing these two questions, we start with a brief sketch of the nature of the conflict. 
 
The Nature of the Colombian Conflict 
 
The Colombian conflict is difficult to define or categorise (McLean, 2002). Apparently contrary to 
the general internationalising or globalising trends in many areas of human and social activity, 
conflicts have become predominantly domestic over the last decades (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 
2001). The Colombian conflict is in this category in the sense that both its causes (actors) and 
consequences (victims, costs) are predominantly domestic. 
 
The principal illegal armed groups are: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC). The 
current constellation of the conflict emerged in the 1960s when FARC and ELN were founded. 
FARC was created in 1966 after government forces attacked a leftist rural militia, aligned with the 
Liberal Party during the La Violencia period.7 ELN was created in 1964 and has been supported by 
                                                 
6 “Diplomacia por la paz”, El Tiempo, 21/07/1997:12A. 
7 In this way, the current conflict is linked to La Violencia, starting in the second half of the 1940s and characterized by 
political violence driven by the opposition between followers of the Liberal and Conservative parties. These parties 
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the Cuban government. It is significantly smaller than FARC.8 Both FARC and ELN adhered to a 
Marxist ideology. A third important guerrilla movement, the M-19, and a few smaller groups, laid 
down arms in 1990 and many of its members are currently active politicians.9 The para-military 
(self-defense) groups originated at the end of the 1970s, but only in 1997 a representative 
organisation, involving most of these groups, was established as the AUC. These groups built their 
strength on their connexions with drugs trade in the second half of the 1980s (idem FARC, since 
1982). Only after that they started to develop a political agenda. 
 
Initially, the Colombian conflict thus belonged to what Rogers (2002) has called the category of 
“anti-elite insurgencies and rebellions often stemming from the development of radical social 
movements” as a result of socio-economic divisions. Ethnic, religious or (sub-) nationalist drivers 
are completely absent in the Colombian case. 
 
The fact that drugs trade plays a crucial role in financing the conflict, that terrorist techniques are 
used, that the conflict has crossed the borders with neighbouring countries, or that there are linkages 
between rebel groups and political movements abroad, does not change the qualification as an 
internal conflict, although the international (regional) dimensions of the conflict are clearing out. It 
is not impossible, in one of the more pessimistic scenarios, that the internal conflict gradually 
moves in the direction of a so-called “complex regional conflict” (Buzan, 1991). 
 
In order to qualify as a civil war, the conflict, apart from being internal, should show two additional 
characteristics: a minimum scale and a sufficient level of socialisation. As far as the scale of the 
conflict is concerned, it was initially and until the 1980s very limited. According to often used 
criteria for characterising civil wars as causing a minimum of 1000 conflict-related casualties per 
year, the Colombian conflict was not a civil war for many years.10 After the intensification of the 
conflict at the end of the 1980s the number of casualties started to rise above 1000. Restrepo et al. 
(2003) estimate an annual average of about 3150 conflict-related casualties in the 1988-2002 period. 
However, according to the State Failure Task Force (Gurr, 1998), the conflict should still not be 
characterised as a civil war, but rather as a war of guerrillas of low intensity (causing between 1000 
and 10000 political casualties per year). 
 
As far as the socialisation of the conflict is concerned, the majority view seems to be that it shows 
low levels of socialisation. Although it objectively affects the majority of the population in some 
way or another, the illegal armed groups have not succeeded in mobilising important sectors of the 
population and polarising society.11 It would therefore not be correct to call the Colombian conflict 
a civil war (Pizarro, 2002).12 The low levels of socialisation of the conflict are linked to its apparent 
coexistence with relatively solid (democratic) institutions and a relatively high level of legitimacy 
of the state. This makes it an a-typical conflict, when put in a global/comparative perspective. If one 
looks at indicators of State legitimacy like participation rates in national elections, legal opacity, 
corruption perceptions, or corruption, for example, Colombia scores better than the lowest score 
available for the EU.13 The legal environment of freedom of press is comparable to Italy’s (Deutsch, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
had been in power since independence in the early XIX century. During a period of “consensual” dictatorship from 
1953 till 1957, most of the militias were dismantled. In 1957, both traditional parties agreed on a mechanism to 
alternate power during four presidential terms (ending in 1974), called the Frente Nacional. Estimates of FARC’s 
strength in terms of numbers of combatants fluctuate between 15000 and 20000. FARC formed a political 
organisation, called Unión Patriótica, but this movement was practically exterminated at the end of the 1980s. 
8 ELN once counted 5000 combatants, but is believed to dispose of a much smaller number than that today. 
9 The M-19 was created after the 1970 presidential elections. 
10 See e.g. Singer and Small (1982). 
11 See e.g. Posada (2001). 
12 For a critical perspective, see e.g. Ramírez Tobón (2002). 
13 See: www.electionworld.org; www.opacity-index.com; www.transparency.org. Any selection of indicators is 
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2004). It is also true, however, that Colombia scores significantly below the EU benchmark on the 
gini coefficient, showing the limited redistributive capacity of the Colombian State.14  
 
The long duration of the conflict contributes to its complexity, because elements of auto-
sustainability, like action-reaction patterns and the institutionalisation of violence as a way to settle 
differences, have been generated. The conflict has acquired new characteristics over the last 
decades. On the one hand, there was a move from a “war of guerrillas” to a “war of positions”. On 
the other hand, the modes of financing of this ‘war’ has changed and increased in volume, due to 
increasing involvement with the illegal drugs trade and the rise of the so-called ‘kidnap industry’. 
This corroborates Collin’s analysis of civil wars over the 1965-1999 period and his conclusion that 
financial viability of organisations in conflict, often related to the existence of natural resources, is a 
major variable for explaining the existence of today’s conflicts (Collier, 2000). 
 
Finally, a survey of foreign intervention aimed at ending internal conflicts (Walter, 1997; Tokatlian, 
1999), shows that few conflicts that ended in the second half of the XX century did so at the 
negotiation table. Those conflicts that did end through negotiations, tended to do so through 
intervention of a third credible country. This leads us to two considerations. First, it is likely that 
given the type of conflict, a role could and should be played by external actors in order to bring the 
conflict closer to its end, even taking its sui generis characteristics into account. Second, given the 
relatively high degree of legitimacy of the (weak) state in Colombia, it should be carefully analysed 
what “neutral” intervention by third countries really means. Interventions by third countries that 
systematically by-pass the state might well be counterproductive because they contribute to further 





Coordination among whom? 
 
When looking at the policy coordination issue in this particular case, a complex map of actors 
comes to the fore and, therefore, the difficulty of coordinating EU policy with the current 
institutional architecture. Even when only focussing on the European side, the picture is quite 
complex. A fluid panorama of actors appears, where next to the official actors at the regional and 
national levels, a series of actors appear on the (blurred) borderline between state and non-state 
actors and where certain proximities between European and Colombian actors (clustered around 
‘Brussels’, on the one hand, and around ‘Bogotá’, on the other) are not without relevance. EU 
support is also part of an ongoing and more encompassing international community endeavour to 
help resolve the conflict in Colombia. This endeavour is steered at donor conferences, such as those 
organised in Madrid, Bogotá and Brussels in 2000 and 2001, and London in 2003, or is channelled 
through international organizations such as the UN and the OAS. This implies that Europe is in 
reality a heterogeneous actor, operating through different modalities and on different levels. The 
coordination issue cannot be reduced to a simple coordination game between ‘Europe’ and its 
member states. 
 
The European actors clustered around Brussels include, first, the institutional actors at the 
supranational level: Council, EC, European Parliament (EP) and its political fractions. Their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
arbitrary. Nevertheless, since the lack of legitimacy is being tested here as an explanatory variable for the existence 
of the conflict, variables should be selected that are not mere expressions of the conflict itself (like e.g. the number 
of victims of the conflict). They are (and should be) chosen from independent sources. 
14 See, Human Development Report 2005 [www.hdr.undp.org] 
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policies cover not only political but also economic and developmental aspects like humanitarian 
assistance and longer term programmes for vulnerable populations, and are therefore spread over 
the three pillars of European policies.15 A whole range of programmes and projects are in place and 
the institutional gravitation point (in Brussels) shifts with the type of policies concerned: sometimes 
the Commission takes the lead, sometimes the European Council, the European Parliament, national 
governments, etc. political activities of EU actors are difficult to catch in budgetary terms, but as far 
as aid is concerned, from the mid-1990s onwards, the EC and separate EU member states had 
already been increasing their budget allocations to multilateral agencies, humanitarian programmes, 
university cooperation and civil society organisations in Colombia. Colombia stood out as the main 
zone of operations in South America for the European humanitarian aid agency (ECHO). The EU 
and its member states combined are the largest humanitarian aid and development cooperation 
donors to the CAN countries16, and the Andean region is the only one in the world with which the 
EU has a special high-level dialogue on drugs (since 1995). In that cooperative framework, 
precursors agreements were signed between the EU and each Andean country separately, and a 
process was installed to monitor implementation of these agreements.17 
 
National state actors develop their activities from their respective capitals and from Bogotá 
alongside EU actors. European efforts to cooperate over security and hence the task of ‘combating 
terrorism’ remains a matter that largely resides in the hands of national governments. In this respect, 
different European governments foster different sorts of policies, in accordance with political 
affinities, traditions, and other singularities. The same holds for development aid at the national 
level, although efforts to coordinate aid packages have been made and were sometimes successful. 
Spain, Sweden, Italy, France and The Netherlands appear the more active EU member states in 
Colombia. Spain assumes a de facto leadership role in EU-Latin America policy, for historical, 
cultural and economic reasons. This is not only the case for Spanish governmental policies towards 
Latin America, but also within the European institutions where Spanish nationals are particularly 
active. Colombia and Spain have, moreover, extensive security cooperation agreements. And 
particular Spanish expertise on ETA has been made available to Colombian enforcement agencies, 
as well as British expertise that stems from coping with the IRA. However, on the basis of detailed 
information on project cooperation, there does not seem to be a clear pattern indicating a division of 
labour according to policy areas, sectors or geographical subregions among EU donors. Some 
countries (Spain) are slightly more willing to collaborate with government agencies than other 
countries. Other examples of bilateral initiatives include the signature by France of a separate 
security cooperation agreement with Colombia in July 2003. Practical enforcement cooperation in 
combating the flow of drugs, generally seen to be the main source feeding the conflicts in 
Colombia, is provided for in port control agreements concluded with the Netherlands. Many 
member states channel their cooperation funds through UN agencies which dilutes their influence 
on policy making but increases their potential impact by pooling resources. Apparently, there is a 
tendency since the 2000 Madrid meeting to pass on the activities and funding in relation to 
humanitarian aid to the EU level in a “philosophy of unifying efforts and of complementarity” with 
important impact in coordination on the field.18  
 
                                                 
15 The different policy regimes are explained in detail by, e.g. Bretherton and Vogler (1999). For a critical and 
alternative view, based on four modi operandi, see Torrent (2005). 
16 See, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.htm 
17 See, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/drugs/coc.htm.  
18 Cf. Cooperación Española en Colombia, memoria 2001-2003, pg. 83-84. www.aeci.es This document explains that 
the EU Presidency of Spain in Colombia was used as a mechanism to propose and start up coordination meetings 
between EC and member states cooperation responsible (monthly) and between NGOs (bimonthly) including 
contacts with UN and national authorities as well as a shared web-based project database available on 
www.acci.gov.co  
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European policy-making towards the Colombian conflict is strongly influenced by non-
governmental actors, not only as lobbyists in the policy-preparation phase but also as subcontractors 
in the implementation phase. European civil society actors with an interest in Colombia range from 
large international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), over medium-size non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other non-profit outfits that are based in one of the European member 
states and there gather private and governmental budgets for funding their own activities in 
Colombia or for funding the activities of Colombian partner organisations, to low-budget 
organisational constructs which support special interest advocacy work. When looked upon from a 
party-political perspective, European politicians termed ‘progressive’ are targeted most 
consistently, both in national politics and in the EP. In that last institution, advocacy work with a 
special interest in a certain interpretation of the human rights problematic tends to focus on the 
socialist group and the smaller group of Gauche Unitaire Européenne and Nordic ecologists. 
Business groups with an interest in Colombia, meanwhile, lobby with right-wing members of the 
same Parliament. As to the contents of non-commercial civil society activity, European NGOs 
support socio-economic development activities and humanitarian aid in Colombia. They tend to do 
so by sending over their own people and transferring money and technology to Colombia. These 
European ‘development’ NGOs are also seen to financially support their Colombian partners’ 
endeavours at local civil society capacity-building. 
 
Concern for human rights violations in Colombia is manifest in many European civil society 
activities. That concern is articulated in advocacy activity performed in Europe by networks and 
special interest groups, such as the Oficina de Derechos Humanos – Acción Colombia 
(OIDHACO).19 In the politically inspired approach to Colombia’s human rights problem, 
OIDHACO activity does not differ from that undertaken by Colombia-desks at large international 
non-governmental human rights organisations; nor is all European advocacy work on Colombia 
orchestrated by OIDHACO. It is one among more actors on that scene. Some networks are even 
seen to obstruct the activities organised by other NGOs in Europe, such as the spring 2002 launch 
of the Pax Christi Holland campaign to advocate a coherent European policy vis-à-vis kidnapping 
(of Europeans) in Colombia. What appears is thus a conglomerate of radical political activity on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, several politically neutral arrangements that promote 
‘constructive’ socio-economic cooperation activity and politically disinterested academic work.20  
 
However, Colombia-related activity around Brussels is not the province of European organisations 
and networks only. Representatives of several Colombian organisations - some of which are funded 
by European NGOs – have become regular visitors on the European human rights scene from the 
late 1980s onwards. An important move in that direction was made in 1988, when a Comisión 
colombiana de Juristas was set up as a branch of the Geneva-based Commission Internationale de 
Juristes. The Colectivo de abogados José Alvear Restrepo is another example of a Colombian 
lawyers’ organisation that gained high visibility at the European human rights scene. As has been 
the case with the aforementioned organisations, this was achieved largely with the aid of certain 
European NGOs.21  
 
                                                 
19 European NGOs contributing funds include: Novib, kolko e.V. – Menschenrechte für Kolumbien, Diakonie Alemania 
– Departamento de Derechos Humanos, 11.11.11, Fastenopfer, Civis, Federación de Asociaciones de Defensa y 
Promoción de los derechos Humanos-España, Diözesanrat der Katholiken im Bistum Aachen, Taula catalana per la 
Pau I els Drets Humans a Colòmbia, Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos (FIDH), Secours Catholique-
Caritas Francia, Terre des hommes – Deutschland e.V., Action pro Colombia Aachen, Oxfam Solidarité, Misereor, 
Paz y Tercer Mundo, Broederlijk Delen, Comité pour les droits humains en Colombie “Daniel Gillard”, Christian 
Aid. 
20 E.g. the Red de Académicos europeos por Colombia. 
21 A Belgian chapter of Oxfam has been funding this Colectivo de abogados for more than a decade, as did the Catholic 
Belgian NGO Broederljjk Delen. 
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In this diverse landscape, coordinating endeavours exist, although they do not encompass the entire 
civil society spectrum. A Coordination des ONGs françaises groups no more than 10 French 
NGOs, under the leadership of Secours Catholique. A Dutch coordination of Colombia-related 
activity is organised by the Bureau Beleidsvorming Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, an 
institutionalised advocacy outfit that has an intermediary position between the Dutch NGO 
community and the governmental (funding) agencies. This last coordination structure encompasses 
a larger section of the Dutch civil society than does the French Colombia coordination, and in its 
turn, it is less radical in political orientation than the Coordination belge pour la Colombie.22 This 
Belgian coordination, in its turn, brings together representatives of several Belgian NGOs, 
international NGOs’ Brussels lobby offices and still other civil society groups. These Brussels-
based ‘selective coordination meetings’ are organised by the very small but active Comité pour le 
respect des Droits Humains ‘Daniel Gillard’. 
 
Turning now to the Bogotá cluster, at the beginning of 2005 there were 13 Member States with 
diplomatic representation in Colombia: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands and the UK, alongside the 
official EC delegation and the important Norwegian and Swiss representations. This means, among 
other things, that common and/or coordinated positions on the conflict in Colombia transmitted by 
the diplomatic delegations, do not necessarily involve all EU member states. As funds for 
humanitarian assistance are mainly channelled through the ECHO office, many member states’s 
embassy’s staff involved in the humanitarian sector often focus instead on cultural and 
environmental issues and small scale social projects. There is a de facto division of labour between 
the national and communitary delegations in the field. For human rights and terrorism related 
issues, information sharing and coordination mechanisms have been put in place, although this does 
not necessarily mean that Europe has become less reactive to events and more proactive. Especially 
for smaller member states, the possibility to stand behind common declarations has proved to be 
important. The presence of NGOs in Colombia, meanwhile, increased through projects, declarations 
and other initiatives, when the conflict escalated as of the mid-90s.23 Not only in Brussels or 
Strasbourg, but also in Colombia well-coordinated NGO forums intervene directly with the EU,24 
by following closely European Institutions’ events concerning Colombia and publishing widely e.g. 
conclusions of the UN Commission on Human Rights,25 or by coordinating interventions with 
central EC policy makers through lobbying offices in Brussels. However, only few European NGOs 
operate directly in Colombia. The majority operates with the intermediation of a local partner who 
receives part of the resources obtained from public and private sources in the respective European 
NGO’s countries of origin. European NGOs operating directly in Colombia come mainly from 
Spain26 and Sweden,27 followed by Italy28 and France29. In the German case, foundations are 
predominant, some of which engage in academic and dissemination activities on the conflict and the 
peace process.30  
                                                 
22 See, http://cbc.collectifs.net  
23 “Organizaciones europeas respaldan iniciativas de paz”, en El Espectador, 20 de septiembre de 1997, p. 13A. 
24 See e.g. OIDHACO, “Recomendaciones sobre Colombia a la Presidencia Holandesa de la Unión Europea – julio a 
diciembre 2004”. 
25 Press release, Colombian Commission of Jurists, 22 April 2004. 
26 E.g. Acción contra el hambre; Caritas Española; Spanish Red Cross; Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la 
Libertad; International Solidarity; Intermon Spain; Médicos del mundo; Educación sin fronteras; ISCOD Spain; Paz 
y Tercer Mundo. 
27 SICDA; Diakonia; Caritas Sweden; Civis; Forum Syd; International Industrial Council; Sind. 
28 International Committee for the Development of Peoples; Cooperazione Internazionale; Movimondo MOLISV; 
MLAL. 
29 France Solidarité; French Red Cross; Médecins du Monde. 
30 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Development Cooperation; Hanns Seidel Stiftung; Alexander 
von Humboldt Institute; Casa Colombo-Alemana. See e.g. Kurtenbach (2005). 
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Policy coordination in practise 
 
In order to assess the degree and quality of European policy coordination since the Pastrana 
government, we analysed the development of the conflict and European policies and actions 
towards it over the 1998-2004 period.31 This period has been marked by: (i) Pastrana’s initiative for 
a dialogue with FARC and the (‘so-called’) Caguan peace process; (ii) the launching of Plan 
Colombia32; (iii) the débacle of the Caguan process; (iv) the 2002 presidential elections, won by 
Alvaro Uribe; (v) the agreement of Santafé de Ralito on a conditional ceasefire between the 
government and the AUC, signed in 2003; and (vi) the inclusion of Colombian organizations in the 
list of terrorist organizations by the Council. 
 
As already suggested when mapping actors in the previous section, European policy towards the 
Colombian conflict appears the result of the functioning of a complex machinery, not operating 
according to a set of simple coordination rules, but rather as a multi-level governance system with 
moving decision-making centres and overlapping jurisdictions, although not without the capacity to 
learn and coordinate.  
 
A few factors seem to drive policy coordination. The first one is related to the fact that in matters of 
foreign policy, certain member states tend to take up leadership roles and are driving European 
opinion and forge a common stance on political issues. As mentioned before, they do this for 
historical, political or economic reasons. In particular, Spain was already mentioned. However, the 
coalitions of leading member states seem to vary with time or according to the specific issue of 
concern. France, Spain and Sweden, for example, pushed for active participation of European 
diplomatic delegations in the dialogues between government and FARC (1998-1999), emitting a 
strong political signal to the parties in the conflict.33 But when the 2002 Donor Conference failed to 
conclude on formal EU commitments, Swedish and Belgian government officials were heard to be 
explicit in their opposition to Plan Colombia. Later, Sweden, The Netherlands and Germany took 
the lead in committing support to the Organisation of American States’ mission to accompany the 
Colombian government’s negotiation with paramilitary blocks and to verify the paramilitary cease-
fire, a few months after the EU’s initial cool reaction to the Uribe administration’s progress in its 
endeavour to get a formal negotiation process going with a section of the paramilitary self-defence 
groups in 200434 and its refusal to cooperate.35 
 
A second factor concerns the role of the EP. Although it is often taken for granted that the power 
and influence of the EP is limited, European foreign policy coordination appears enhanced when the 
EP emits clear signals. Some of the concerns and considerations that were recorded in Europe when 
the Plan Colombia was announced, for example, were articulated in a debate at the EP at the end of 
which the EP voted its 1/2/2001 Resolution on ‘Plan Colombia and support to the Colombian peace 
                                                 
31 For further details we refer also to: Vranckx (2004) and Ramírez (2004a, 2004d). 
32 The so-called Plan Colombia refers to President Pastrana’s endeavour to obtain financial support from the 
international community related to his presidential programme (multi-annual development plan), which was 
approved by the Colombian Congress in 1998. That programme was budgeted at U.S. $ 7.5 billion, and aspired at 
getting a peace process going with Colombian guerrilla, while at the same time strengthen the State institutions and 
curb the drug economy. For a critical perspective, see e.g. Estrada (2001). 
33  “Suecia le apuesta a la paz”, El Espectador, 2/07/1999. 
34 One year after the Acuerdo de Santafé de Ralito between the Colombian government and the paramilitary blocks on 
15 July 2003 
35 Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the European union on the occasion of the formal start of talks between the 
Government of Colombia and the AUC paramilitary groups, Brussels, 20 June 2004, 10167/04 (Presse 194); “Llegó 
la hora cero para el inicio del proceso de desmovilización de los paramilitares”, El Tiempo, 1/7/2004; “La Unión 
Europea saluda proceso con paramilitares, pero no asiste a él”, El Tiempo, 30/6/2004. 
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process’, with an overwhelming 474 votes to 2 and a few abstentions. From then on, policy 
coordination went visibly smoother.36 
 
A third exogenous factor is the role played by the US policies and specific measures as a catalyst 
for European policy coherence. This happened clearly when US Congress decided to allocate 
budgets for Plan Colombia in June 2000, and after which Washington announced to pledge USD 
1,3 billion, only 238 million of which was not earmarked for military aid. This announcement from 
the side of the US was not met with universal satisfaction. In fact, some saw it to conduce to 
‘further militarization’ of the Colombian situation. As such, the US pledge met with harsh criticism 
in certain circles within the US, Colombia, and Europe. In this respect, Plan Colombia’s appeal in 
Washington would even prove to undermine the possibility to obtain European funding for 
Colombian endeavours. 
 
In spite of these driving factors, at times some member states prefer to act alone or, at least, to 
differentiate their behaviour while formally adhering to a common European position. 
 
Preceding Europe’s refusal to back Plan Colombia, both Prime Minister Tony Blair and then 
Spanish President José María Aznar, for example, made commitments to president Pastrana (to 
support the Plan) and were heavily criticised for it afterwards.37 Later, Spain organised an 
international Donor Conference to seek funding for a non-military part of Plan Colombia on 10 July 
2000. The EU as such, and its member states other than Spain, abstained from making formal 
pledges, notwithstanding the fact that the EU CFSP High Representative had already demonstrated 
his willingness earlier on to accommodate Pastrana’s requests. In fact, the whistle was blown on 
Javier Solana for these commitments, which had not been duly consulted with EU institutions. After 
Plan Colombia was officially rejected by the EU, division continued or was even reinforced. 
Several European diplomats in Colombia questioned the radical rejection and openly asked whether 
it did not wrongly neglect the necessity to strengthen Colombia’s institutional capacity and, more in 
particular, the modernization of the armed forces and security apparatus as one of the necessary 
conditions for reaching a solution to the conflict (Massé, 2003).  
 
When some EU countries that accompanied the dialogues between the government and FARC 
started to move towards a mediating role, they were heavily criticised by others and even collided 
with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose office was mainly financed by Europe, 
by the way.  
 
Another example is related to arms exports. Little European support has materialised for answering 
president Uribe’s repeated calls for military aid from Europe.38 Assistance in that field of activity 
resorts to the level of national governments, and as such the decision about that assistance is likely 
to be marked by political considerations and affinities. Several European states would even be 
prevented from allowing commercial military exports to Colombia, by their national arms exports 
laws and by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that prevents them from exporting military 
equipment to a country engaged in armed conflict and/or that has already been turned down by 
another European exporter.39 Spain, nevertheless, did donate military aid to Colombia, although the 
content of that aid has become clearly restricted to ‘non-offensive’ material (ambulance planes) and 
training (such as in landmine eradication).40 
 
                                                 
36 See e.g. Memorias 2001-2003 of the Spanish Cooperation (p. 83). 
37 “The Last Thing Colombia Needs is More Weapons”, The Independent, 23/5/2000. 
38 This aid was requested after the European-Colombia meeting in Bogotá, May 2003.  
39 More on that matter in European Arms Exports to Latin America,  www.ipisresearch.be 
40 The Spanish and Colombian Defence ministries signed an agreement to that end on 23/9/2004. 
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A particular case of acting as cavalier seul is the use of the veto right in the Council. In the run up 
to the May 2002 meeting of the EU and Latin America + Caribbean, organised under the Spanish 
presidency (Madrid Summit), commotion arose over intentions to add the FARC guerrilla to a 
European terrorist list. At that time, that list already included the Colombian paramilitary AUC.41 
Inclusion on that list would undo prerogatives which FARC spokespersons enjoyed in European 
countries (visa, refugee status). Sweden, later joined by France, initially vetoed the inclusion of 
FARC on the European terrorist list.42 Such inclusion was argued to obstruct the next Colombian 
presidency to begin new negotiations. The failure of European governments to reach an agreement 
for including FARC on its terrorist list caused Europe to be criticized bitterly in Colombia,43 as the 
controversy concurred with the May 2002 mass killing in Bojayá, department of Chocó, where 
more than a hundred people died in a church that was bombed by FARC. Swedish UN High 
Commissioner Anders Kompass restricted his criticism to the Colombian State, for having failed to 
prevent the tragedy, and to the paramilitary troops assumed to have provoked FARC to detonate the 
bomb. In Colombia, this statement proved difficult to appreciate, and European ‘anti-militarism’ – 
which some Colombians also took to have blocked substantial European funding for Plan Colombia 
- was played out against human rights concerns and still other considerations presumed to be on 
European agendas. The Swedish government effectively changed its view in the aftermath of the 
Bojayá tragedy and after President Pastrana met with the late Anna Lindh, then Swedish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. After this ‘Swedish Turn’ the inclusion of FARC on the common EU terrorist list 
was decided rapidly at a meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and 
formalised at the next Council meeting, in Luxembourg on 13 June 2002. Surprisingly, early 2003, 
France announced that it would be willing to receive and harbour FARC guerrilleros ‘were these to 
be liberated in a humanitarian agreement’.44 That commitment corresponds at least in part to overt 
and covert French governmental endeavours to negotiate the liberation of the kidnapped French-
Colombian former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.45 
 
The fact that individual member states sometimes try hard to push their (minority) position through 
does not necessarily mean that country policies are consistent over time. The Belgian government, 
for example, was seen to have pushed for the inclusion of FARC on the European terrorist list - an 
action that was certainly not ‘on demand’ of the dense civil society networking in the Heart of 
Europe. But weeks after the inclusion of FARC, Belgium was reported to have successfully stopped 
the inclusion of the ELN on that same list. By mid-2002, the ELN was no longer talking with 
Colombian representatives in Havana, a fact taken to be significant. The inclusion on the European 
terrorist list of this second Colombian guerrilla organisation was therefore believed to become a fact 
at the next occasion where that list would be revisable, even though – quite remarkably - Belgium 
had expressed reservations on the matter.46 These or other reservations appeared to have been more 
                                                 
41 The EU “terrorist list” was introduced in December 2001 in the aftermath of the 11/9/2001 events, and included AUC 
from the onset. Spain and Belgium are reported to have eventually pushed the idea to include FARC (“Cumbre de 
Madrid condenará terrorismo”, El Tiempo, 16/05/2002). 
42 Decision-making on the list is a CFSP issue, which the Treaty of the European Union defines to resort to an 
intergovernmental ‘Pillar II’ scheme: policy formulation takes place within the context of the Council of Ministers 
and its Working Groups, almost exclusively on the basis of unanimity. 
43 See e.g. “El despiste europeo”, El Tiempo, 5/5/2002. 
44 El Tiempo, 9/1/2003. The offer was repeated later on, e.g. in September 2004, see “Francia mantiene oferta de 
facilitar refugio a guerrilleros que se beneficenen de acuerdo humanitario”, El Tiempo, 10/9/2004. 
45 In July 2003, the then French foreign affairs minister Dominique de Villepin’s envoy was - somewhat embarrassingly 
- found aboard a French Hercules airplane that had landed in Manaus without previous notice to the Brazilian 
authorities. These authorities were not allowed to inspect the plane, for it claimed diplomatic status. The Hercules 
was alleged to be equipped so as to provide a medical check-up to Ingrid Betancourt, whom the French expected to 
be liberated in Brazil at that time.  
46 Several sources ascribed Belgian reluctance to put ELN on the European terrorist list to the liberation of European 
kidnap victims in the first half of 2002. The Belgian member of parliament who negotiated that liberation, candidly 
and publicly claimed ELN had remained off that list thanks to his insistence (Meeting at the Maison de la 
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problematic than anticipated, as it would take the EU Council almost two more years before it could 
include the ELN on the list.47 This achievement could not be taken for the result of a transparent 
political or public debate, but must still be seen as government-endorsed.  
 
In contrast, a German change of approach was the outcome of a parliamentary debate that had 
lasted seven months, after which the Bundestag approved an 18 paragraph motion that sets out the 
lines of a new German policy vis-à-vis Colombia.  In a crucial first paragraph to the motion, the 
German parliament urges the government to support president Álvaro Uribe in his task to have the 
public forces recuperate the monopoly of military force in his country. In this, the motion could not 
possibly contrast more with a certain German policy of the past, whereby both private German 
entities and citizens, and their government, were seen to cut deals with armed non-state actors that 
undermined the Colombian state’s monopoly of military force in order to facilitate the release of 
kidnapped citizens or to avoid kidnapping. Moreover, Germany sent Claudia Roth (of Bundnis 90), 
its parliamentary commissioner for human rights, to Bogotá on 2 October 2003. In Bogotá, Roth 
announced that Germany would urge the EU to appoint a High Commissioner, in line with the 
parliamentary motion. In the meanwhile, the German government gave its full support to its 
Colombian homologue’s request that Europe finally come to consider the ELN guerrilla as a 
terrorist organisation.  
 
One could label as ‘policy differentiation’ instances when member states do not collide with the 
majority or common European position but, in any case, pursue a distinctive policy within the 
broader agreed framework. This was the case when in the months following the February 2001 EP 
Resolution, EU member states were to put forward their pledges to complement the Commission’s 
aid commitment. A ‘Third Meeting of the Support Group of the Peace Process’ was organised 
jointly by the EC and the IDB in April. Swedish State Secretary Gun-Brit Andersson formally 
announced the concerted EU support to Colombia’s peace endeavours at that occasion. She stated 
that for the EU, the first objective of the meeting was “to grant full political support for the peace-
efforts of President Pastrana”. Some European countries had by that time become facilitators of the 
presidential talks with guerrilla groups and had been asked to become even more involved in the 
near future. The EU presented a multi-annual and overall support package worth more than EUR 
330 million. Commissioner Patten confirmed the contribution which the EC had announced a few 
months previously and had topped up in the meanwhile to EUR 140 million. The remaining EUR 
190 million was pledged by different European member states. The more important contributions 
came from Spain, Sweden, France and Germany. Small countries such as Belgium and Holland 
made relatively substantial pledges too. The UK declared in its country profile on Colombia it “is 
contributing to an EU package…” and “will continue to support the work of the EU…”48 in a direct 
reference to the decisions made in the third meeting of the support group for the Peace process held 
in Brussels. In practice, many of these European pledges and programmes could be recognised as a 
refocusing - and in some case a mere re-labelling - of the support that Colombia had been receiving 
until then, through ‘non-concerted’ European aid strategies. Apart from peace laboratories, the 
concerted European aid package provided for resources to “combat violence and human rights 
violations”, and to “relieve the social impact of conflict (displaced people, children involved in 
conflict and alternative development in areas where manual eradication of drug crops takes place)”. 
The so-called “Actions to increase the respect for human rights and stimulate a peace culture” 
would come to be funded by Sweden, Finland, the UK and Belgium.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Communauté française on 11/10/2002), suggesting a deal was cut so that the ELN would abstain from kidnapping 
Europeans in the future as long as Europe did not consider that organisation terrorist. ELN has not complied with its 
part of that deal, if ever there was one. 
47 Official Journal of the European Union, L 99/28, 3/4/2004. 
48 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Country Profile Colombia, accessed 13 Aug 2004. 
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A final remark relates to Europe’s capacity to learn. It should be recognised that recent years have 
seen progress, especially related to coordination of European actors in Colombia. Regular meetings 
are now organized between the Delegation, the Presidency and the diplomatic missions, together 
with responsables for cooperation, human rights and security, and policy papers have been 
prepared. This, together with the consensus reached at the donor meetings, the EU has been able to 
act in a more coordinated way and assume common positions on crucial issues and in crucial 
moments. Concrete and far reaching experiences as the (failed) Caguan peace process with the 
FARC under President Pastrana in 1998-2002 obliging member states representatives to coordinate 





We now turn to the second question guiding this chapter, namely whether EU policies with respect 
to the Colombian conflict are increasingly built on an interregional model. 
 
Looking first at the institutional framework, since the emergence of the Andean Pact in 1969, inter-
regional relations have developed through different types of agreements, showing growing 
complexity and diversification. Whereas the initial agreements focused on trade, more recent 
agreements and common declarations are much wider in scope. The political dialogue in the context 
of the Rio Group was institutionalised in 1990. Five agreements on chemical precursors for 
narcotics production were signed in 1995. The Declaration of Cochabamba (1996) includes shared 
responsibility of drugs producers and consumers and is followed by the Declaration of Rome on 
Political Dialogue in the same year. A new EU-CAN Framework Agreement was signed in 1998.  
 
Late in 2001, the EU launched the Andean programme on human rights and democracy 2002-2005. 
The Second Summit of Madrid, held in May 2002, opened space for a new EU-CAN strategy for 
2002-2006. Resources were allocated in different areas amongst which notably an initiative for 
Andean Regional Stability, supporting CAN in the field of conflict prevention. This concurs with 
the EC Regional Strategy paper where the challenge of peace building in Colombia is clearly stated 
as a main issue, along with measures to stop drug trafficking. Resources are also foreseen for 
controlling the trade in chemical precursors amenable to the production of illegal drugs. Most of the 
programmes are implemented through NGOs. Concrete experiences of intervention in Andean 
conflicts are almost inexistent. The vast majority of European resources are destined to bilateral 
cooperation and only a minority to biregional projects with limited effects.49 The fast reaction 
mechanism of the EU –-designed at the Helsinki Council of December 1999 to strengthen its civil 
intervention capacity in crisis situations and forming part of the CFSP agenda approved in February 
2001—has only been mobilized in Bolivia thus far. 
 
On 15 October 2003, the EC, on behalf of the EU member states, and the Andean Community 
finalised negotiations on a new Political and Cooperation Agreement which was signed in Rome on 
15 December 2003. This Agreement on Political Dialogue and Cooperation included not only 
counternarcotics endeavours, integration, governance, poverty eradication and  migration issues, but 
also topics on security and terrorism.50 The arrangement has been endorsed by the Declaration of 
                                                 
49 Regio-to-region cooperation includes projects aimed at the creation of the Andean common market (quality 
standards, tariffs, competition policy), strengthening of the integration process, democracy, human rights and 
prevention of natural disasters. A coordination office is functioning in Bogotá.  
50 Negotiations for the Agreement were concluded on 15/10/2003 in Quito, Ecuador. The Andean partner felt EU 
interest in negotiating such a regional agreement was only rekindled after the Doha Trade Round failed to conclude 
a global arrangement. See, Fernández de Soto (2004:363-444).  
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Guadalajara of May 2004 and may be upgraded in the future to an association agreement, which is 
to incorporate a free-trade area.51  
 
The main EU policy objective according to the EC “Colombia Country Strategy Paper”52 reads: “to 
support the Peace Process in order to be able to contribute to the stability of the region…”. This 
key strategic document approved in May 2002 links clearly from the start the EC co-operation 
objectives in Colombia with the broader objectives based upon the EC Treaty, article 177, namely 
the Community development co-operation where an economic focus prevails. However in the 
Country Strategy Paper these objectives include also elements which can be all linked in one way or 
another with the conflict in Colombia. This includes not only a general:“…developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law and encouraging the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…”, but also more detailed areas as brought up in the Statement on 
development co-operations and in Regulations53 and in several Communications on Latin 
America54. Elements relevant for the study of the making of EU policies in conflict management for 
Colombia include: “…the promotion of equitable access to social services, food security and 
sustainable rural development, … conflict prevention, …”…“the reply to … drug trafficking, 
terrorism…” or “Human Rights Protection and promotion and attacking the poverty and 
inequalities problems”. Logically the EU involvement in the peace process is “stepped up” and 
several meetings are organised on international level of “the Support Group for the Peace Process in 
Colombia”.55 
 
Coherence seems to emerge when linking and comparing all these EU documents, and it is also 
observable in different Member States strategic papers. What could be an excellent summary of the 
relevant explanatory models in the different EU documents and declarations is written down in the 
country strategy paper of Sweden for Colombia: “...the escalating internal armed conflict in 
Colombia poses a serious general obstacle to development in Colombia. The unequal distribution 
of political and economic power, increasing poverty, weak democratic institutions, widespread 
impunity, crimes against human rights and international humanitarian law, the unequal distribution 
of land, and drug trafficking are obstacles to development that are linked to and mutually reinforce 
one another. They must be addressed to make it possible to achieve sustainable peaceful 
development in Colombia and regional stability” 56, or the statement from the Spanish Cooperation 
agency that “development is the best contribution to peace”. 
 
 
The changing modalities of interregional cooperation reflect changing trends in the international 
environment, rather than a substantial increase or a deepening of the relations between the two 
regions. Neither of the regions is a priority for the other. A combination of factors plays a role in 
explaining the limited development of interregionalism in this case. A first element is the difficult 
political situation in the Andean countries and the weakness of CAN institutions. A second element 
is US bilateralism and its growing political, economic and military presence in the region, 
especially since the launch of Plan Colombia in 2000 and the Andean Regional Initiative in 2001. In 
Europe, diverging views exist on what would or should be an appropriate European (counter-
                                                 
51 Joint communiqué from the meeting of the EU Troika and the Heads of State of the Andean Community, issued at the 
Guadelajara summit on 29 May 2004. 
52Accessed 30 July 2004. 
53 November 2000 Statement of the Council and Commission and the Council regulation (EEC) N. 443/92 of 25 
February 1992 
54 COM (95) 495, COM (99) 105 and COM (2000)  670 
55 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/intro/index.htm pg.2, accessed 13/08/2004. 
56 Regeringskansliet, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Country Strategy for development cooperation, Colombia, January 1 
2003 - December 31 2007 
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)strategy.57 A third element is the low level of objective economic interdependence between the two 
regions and Europe’s prioritary attention for the enlarged EU.  
 
For the EU, with its potential as a world power, it should be possible to partially endogenise these 
factors and be more influential, even with the current levels of budgetary resources destined to the 
region (by the EU and the member states combined).58 For this to happen, a few pre-conditions 
have to be met. First, interregionalism requires higher levels of policy coordination than have been 
established to date. As shown in the previous sections and confirmed by observers like the 
International Crisis Group59, due to divergent interests and relatively weak policy coordination EU 
policy with respect to the Andean region has been characterised by isolated initiatives and 
counterproductive rivalries. Mechanisms should be put in place to guarantee more consistency and 
coordination in relation to anti-drugs policies in third countries, security, migration policies and 
judicial cooperation. 
 
Second, interregionalism would benefit from a working interparliamentary dialogue as shown by its 
contribution to democracy and peace in Central America. The important scale, urgency and critical 
nature of the situation in the Andean region, make a new European interparliamentary initiative 
desirable. This could be a fruitful scenario for exchange of information, intra- and inter-regional 
confidence building, and the gestation of new proposals and initiatives. 
 
Related to the coordination issue, there is an apparent need to develop a stronger analytical capacity 
on the European side, which should permit a better understanding of the complexity of the conflict 
and its context. A pooling of resources of national foreign services, together with the European 
institutions (DG-RELEX) would seem the logical solution here. 
 
This should allow focussing more on border zone problems, revise anti-narcotics policies, recognize 
the changing nature of the conflict and of linkages between the socio-economic and political 
situation in the region and the problematic insertion of their economies in the world economy. 
 
Policies could gain effectiveness if the regional linkages of the conflict would be recognized. As 
mentioned before, the Colombian conflict is increasingly linked with the socio-political situation in 
neighbouring countries and spilling-over through illegal trade circuits (drugs, arms), certain 
proximities between the guerrilla and sectors in these countries, border-crossing by rebel groups 
and displaced populations, etc.60 The development of conflict-related activities, like securing 
strategic corridors, in the geographically complicated but resource-rich border zones fuels the 
conflicts and makes it more difficult to control, especially since income inequality is rampant in 
these areas. The weakness of the regional institutions in the Andes and –consequently- the low 
levels of trust and cooperation, tense Colombo-Venezuelan relations, and traditional US 
bilateralism are all factors that leads one to believe that there is an important margin for action by 
the EU. The multilateral and bi-regional events have not been seized by the EU as a privileged 
opportunity to help the countries of the region move beyond the fundamentally individual and 
reactive postures and stimulate mutual rapprochement and concertation. The EU may not have 
insisted sufficiently on a regional cooperative perspective. In dialogues and interviews with 
different European diplomats accredited in Bogotá, one does not perceive that interregionalism 
refers to conflict resolution; it is rather circumscribed to trade issues. In the dialogues on Andean 
integration, internal border issues are not adequately covered. It is striking also, for example, that 
                                                 
57 On the Colombian side most political forces support diversification of Colombia’s external relations and favor closer 
relations with Europe. See e.g. De Lombaerde (2002). 
58 See also, Ramírez (2004b; 2004c). 
59 IGC, Increasing Europe´s Stake in the Andes, Quito – Brussels, 15 /6/2004; Ramírez (2004a). 
60 On the development of the conflict in the border areas, see for example, Cubides (1998). 
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the joint evaluation of Andean integration which has been initiated after the Guadalajara Summit 
focuses almost entirely on trade integration. This passive stance contrasts with the role Europe has 
played in central America in bringing neigbouring countries closer when these entered in conflict 
because of the mutual negative fall-out of their respective internal conflicts. These interventions 
helped peace negotiations in each of these countries and relaunched a regional integration process. 
 
Pooling resources to monitor the conflict should also allow for Europe to better capture the 
conflict’s changing nature, actors and the dynamics of it. This, in turn, would allow a more 
balanced evaluation of the role of the actors involved and formulate realistic demands (e.g. with 
regard to justice and reparation in a negotiated peace scenario). It would also allow to better 
monitor the impact of European policies and the role of EU-subsidized NGOs in Colombia, and 
reduce Europe’s conceptual dependence on the UN office and the NGOs. 
 
A more coherent policy to combat drugs trafficking is also high on the list of elements that Europe 
might contribute to the peace process in the Andean region. Thus far, the interregional political 
dialogue lacked effect. Although the EU has pronounced itself in favor of a joint fight against drugs 
with multilateral commitments and global strategies involving both producing and consuming 
countries, the practical consequences of this discourse (alternative solutions to fumigation, tackling 
consumption in Europe, tackling trafficking and money laundering) are not clear. 
 
Finally, the design of European institutions and the distribution of competences across governance 
levels, does not prove to be well suited to acknowledge the links between different policy areas. The 
Colombian conflict, and the socio-economic and political crises in the Andean countries for that 
matter, cannot be probed independently from their problematic insertion in the world economy. 
Market access (GSP), although important, is not the only issue which should be settled. The EU 
could contribute to a more harmonious insertion of the Andean economies in the global economy, 





The Colombian conflict is relatively complex. It is an essentially internal conflict, although the 
regional and international dimensions are (increasingly) important. Because of the nature and 
development of the conflict, a negotiated end to it would be expected to require firm involvement of 
third countries. The EU, as a world player, could play such a role but has not done so in Colombia 
thus far. Its role has been modest, as compared to the EU’s political and economic weight, its 
historical and cultural ties with the region, and the objective co-responsibility for certain (but 
essential) aspects of the conflict, such as generating and  laundering drugs money, exports of 
chemical precursors, arms trade, political status of leaders of illegal groups, etc. Colombia and its 
conflict are relatively marginal to its external policy, to an important extent because it is taking 
place in the zone of influence of the US and because economic interests in the country are limited. 
 
 
Coordination, coherence and EU actorness 
 
The Colombian case confirms the perception of the EU as a heterogeneous actor with insufficient 
levels of coordination, often emitting contradictory signals, which reduces the effectiveness of its 
actions. Instead of a solid strategy towards the region, relatively isolated initiatives seem to exist 
that emanate from certain EU member states, not without disputes among them, and motivated by 
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tensions between national and communitary interests. The effort put on seeking protagonism and 
visibility tends to go against the effectiveness of European policy and presence in the Andean 
region, as in the cases of the Plan Colombia and the Caguan peace process. 
 
Although it is perhaps not a solid demonstration of the lack of effectiveness of EU policies, the 
results of the Latinobarometer related to Colombian perceptions of EU policies are interesting. The 
US is perceived by the Colombian citizens as helping more in promoting democracy, defending 
peace and promoting development than the EU (Focus Eurolatino, 2004). Europe’s discourse on 
peaceful conflict settlement, democracy, justice and development is not perceived as necessarily 
reflecting the reality and effectiveness of its policies. 
 
Although the EU is believed to learn from coherence failures (Everts and Keohane, 2003), in this 
case, as in many other cases, European national policies give little evidence of building up to a 
more coherent EU policy, although some learning is observed in the field, as in the area of 
humanitarian aid. When policy coordination takes place, it is not necessarily based on positive 
motivations (effectiveness, efficiency, …): controversial US positions on the way to wage the war 
against drugs traffickers and on illegal armed groups operating in Colombia have also been a 
driving force towards common positions. 
 
The need for more coordination still becomes clear when one observes the fact that decisions 
related to defining a European positions vis-à-vis the conflict in Colombia have sometimes been 
taken, both at the European and national levels, on the basis of lacking, partial or even biased 
information. This is a very strong perception among Colombian and external observers. More 
pooling of resources would strengthen the analytical capacity of the EU (through economies of 
scale), especially for this kind of complex cases that are ascribed relatively low (political/economic) 
importance for the EU. 
 
The case also shows the important role of non-governmental (para-governmental) organisations in 
the policy cycle, and their capacity to monopolise certain policy niches. Diversity and dissent 
marking civil society activities has been mirrored in EU policies on Colombia for considerable 
time. Although it is recognised that, generally speaking, their work is valuable, Colombian 
governmental observers criticize activities of certain sectors of Europan NGOs and their Colombian 
counterparts. Often, NGOs do not limit themselves to their declared work programme related to 
socio-economic or political development. Conflicts have been registered among NGOs over 
resources and prestige, undermining the effectiveness of their operations because they do not 
always succeed in establishing a functional relationship with local authorities and actors and 
because their lack of confidence in the local institutions tends to be exaggerated. The choice of 
location of a project is not always coordinated with local actors, projects do not always contribute to 
community building, and relevant information is rarely passed on to the authorities. European aid 
channeled through NGOs consequently does not always contribute to strengthening the (relatively 
weak) institutions in Colombia. A critical evaluation of the role played by the NGOs in EU’s 
external policies is needed. 
 
The case shows that the analysis in terms of the three pillars is not sufficient to capture the reality of 
EU foreign policy. The empirical evidence suggests that the choice of modality of European 
intervention is rarely based on effectiveness criteria but rather on (least) institutional resistance: at 
the European level, aid and trade, more easily managed by the EC, tend to substitute foreign policy. 
 
Another aspect of EU external policy-making, is the fact that Europeanisation and coordination of 
external policies is not a uni-directional process. Sometimes, when a common position is (finally) 
reached, like in the case of declaring the armed groups terrorist organisations, policy-makers return 
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to their respective national levels to voice discontent and question the consensus reached at the 
European level. One should be aware of the internal functionalism of the existing EU external 
policy machinery: the multiplicity of official actors on different levels is convenient to respond to 
different (internal) political pressures. In cases where the cost of non-coherence or non-coordination 
is not really felt in the member states, the machinery is unlikely to be replaced soon. 
 
Interregionalist strategy and agenda 
 
The institutional framework of interregional relations has contributed to reach some level of policy 
coordination, resulting in coherence at the level of policy documents and official statements. 
 
As far as concrete politics and actions are concerned, the EU could go further and be more proactive 
in an area where third country intervention appears necessary. The EU could play a more important 
role in developing initiatives that contribute to tackling the regional dimension of the conflict, as in 
border zone issues, combating illegal flows of arms and drugs, demonstrating links between illegal 
armed groups and certain sectors in neighbouring countries, etc. Additionally, recognizing 
interdependence between a series of situations and problems in the Andean region would, allow for 
positive feed-back to the policy formulation process on Colombia. Recognizing interconnectedness 
of different policy areas and issues is relevant as well, such as linkages between the processes of 
regional and multilateral trade liberalisation and domestic socio-economic problems. The 
complicated institutional architecture behind EU external policies, however, renders such endeavour 
difficult to translate into concrete politics.  
 
Finally, and with respect to linkages between policy coordination and interregionalism, the case of 
EU conflict management in Colombia illustrates that two-way relationships exist between both 
aspects of the problématique of EU external policies. Better policy coordination would allow to set 
an interregional dialogue and negotiation machinery in motion and define policies with a regional 
scope. On the other hand, interregionalism imposed by the regionalisation of the issues at stake, 
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